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In his Economic Message to Congress on February 9, 1965,
President Johnson requested that any wage increase be a "non-
inflationary" increase of less than 3.2 percent.1 The business com-
munity's failure to react violently to this attempt by the federal
government to influence business policy reflects a dramatic and funda-
mental change in the outlook of business leaders during the past thirty
years. Although some businessmen still cling to the notion that the
business of the corporation is solely to make profits, their position is
not a popular one.2 One author has stated:
The fact is, the profit motive is simply not fashionable today
among emancipated conferees of the Committee for Economic
Development or even in the National Association of Manu-
facturers. It has been dying a lingering, unmourned death
for ten years. Rarely can a big business leader eulogize
it today without being snubbed by his self-consciously frown-
ing peers.3
Most of the debate over the proper role of the private corporation
has been in terms of political and economic analysis. Since the chief
t Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A. Williams
College, 1951; LL.B. University of Wisconsin, 1957.
IN.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 12, cols. 3-4, 8.
2The debate over the corporation's role in society may have begun in its modem
form with an article published by Professor Adolf A. Berle in 1931. Berle, The
Organization of the Law of Corporate Finance, 9 TENN. L. REv. 125 (1931). Since
then, Professor Berle has written four books and numerous articles on the general
subject of the corporate role and has engaged in written debate with two authors.
His books are: BmT & MENs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932) ; BERL., THE 20rH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954) ; BEmE, PowER
WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); BEE, THE AmImcA EcoNoMIc REPUBLIC (1963).
Debate with Professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.: Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. Rtv. 1049 (1931); reply-Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. RrZv. 1145 (1932); rejoinder-Berle, For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1932). Debate
with Associate Professor Henry G. Manne: Manne, Current Views on the "Modern
Corporation," 38 U. DEr. L.J. 559 (1961); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the
Modern Corporation, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 399 (1962) ; reply-Berle, Modern Functions
of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. ZEv. 433 (1962); rejoinder-Manne, Corpo-
rate Responsibility, Business Motivation, and Reality," 343 Annals 55 (1962).
Other works of interest in this field include the following: DRUCKER, THE CON-
cEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1964); LMNGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958) ;
MASON, THE CORPORATION nm MODERN SOcIETY (1960); Douglas, Directors Who Do
Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1934); Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsi-
bility, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct 1958, p. 41.
3 Levitt, supra note 2, at 43.
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concern in analyzing corporate performance has been public welfare,
the questions have often related to the effect of corporate activities
upon the economic system and upon the political organization of the
state.4  The corporate lawyer, however, may have a different focus.
Charged with counseling corporate management, he must be con-
cerned with the traditional and still enforceable legal duties owed by
corporate managers to the corporation and its owners. His clients
are faced with a dilemma articulated by an executive of the General
Electric Company:
If you will pardon me for being personal, it makes a great
difference in my attitude toward my job as an executive offi-
cer of the General Electric Company whether I am a trustee
of the institution or an attorney for the investor. If I am
a trustee, who are the beneficiaries of the trust? To whom
do I owe my obligations?'
The following inquiries may be helpful in finding a solution to
this dilemma:
1. What are the differences between public and private cor-
porate obligations?
2. To what extent do public and private obligations conflict?
3. What liability will be incurred by a corporate manager
who pursues public obligations?
The purpose of this article is to analyze these questions with
regard to private corporations.0 The analysis will be applicable to
small corporations as well as to that group of corporations generally
acknowledged to have public obligations by virtue of their size. Al-
though a large percentage of American business is conducted by rela-
tively few corporations,7 all have the power to act in the public
4 E.g., BERLE, THE EcoNo ic REPuBLIc 100 (1963).
5Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145,
1153 (1932).
IAssistance provided by the Russell Sage Foundation under a grant to North-
western University to promote training and research in law and social science is
gratefully acknowledged. The subject matter of this paper extends beyond legal
analysis into areas of political science and economics. Berle describes the general
subject matter as "that academic no-man's-land where economics, political science,
and law must be drawn on to account for present phenomena and if guidance is desired,
to guide future developments." Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System,
62 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 436 (1962).
7 See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 18
(1932); Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in MASON,
THE CoRPoRATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85-88 (1960). Fortune magazine's annual list
of the largest United States corporations provides impressive statistics regarding size.
E.g., Fortune, July 1965, pp. 149-68. In 1962 Berle reported that: "135 corporations
control about forty-seven per cent of American industrial production now, as they did
in 1932. A fair estimate would be that 600 large corporations control between two-
thirds and three-fourths of that production today . . . ." Berle, Modern Functions
of the Corporate System, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 433, 434 (1962).
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interest.' Even if not great in national terms, the smaller corporation
may have extensive power within a very small community or other
relatively limited sphere of activity.
I. THE PUBLIC OBLIGATION
There are many desirable uses to which management might
devote corporate resources as part of the corporation's obligation to
various segments of the public (including its employees 9 and the com-
munity at large). For example, corporate contributions are often
essential to the very existence of local charities. Similarly, corporate
contributions have been extremely important in the creation of a work-
able system of privately endowed colleges and universities. Corporate
decisions to enter or remain in a community are sometimes made with
the community's employment needs in mind, and therefore become
public welfare decisions. On a larger scale, decisions to settle a strike,
to avoid inflationary wage or price increases, or to invest in the United
States instead of abroad may be made with public policy interests in
mind."0 Assuming that reasonable corporate activities in satisfaction
of public obligations will and should continue, it is nevertheless im-
portant to understand the proper rationale for such activities.
As long ago as 1932, Harvard Professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.
examined the proposition that corporate managers "should concern
themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general
public, as well as of the stockholders . . . . "I He concluded that if
8 A careful distinction should be drawn between size and the separation of owner-
ship from control. A corporation may have public obligations merely because of its
large size. It may also be a publicly held corporation by reason of the distribution of
ownership of its stock and thought to owe some public obligations for this reason.
Although large size and public ownership most often exist together, it is possible for
a publicly held corporation to be small in size or for a closely held corporation to be
large.
9 Some writers assert that the corporation owes an obligation to other groups
connected with it, specifically to the corporation's employees. But, insofar as the
corporation acts to give its employees benefits which are unrelated to profit maxi-
mization, the goal undertaken becomes public rather than private. Use of corporate
resources to improve working conditions, to increase employees' salaries and to
accomplish other improvements in employment conditions, if unrelated to the cor-
poration's profit motives, fall within the public obligation area. On the other hand,
the existence of pressures brought by the employees themselves, in the form of labor
organization, helps to advance the theory which will be asserted here, that most activi-
ties by business corporations which might be open to attack as activities designed
merely to satisfy public obligations are supportable upon normal profit maximization
theories.
10 A list of possible objects of corporate charity appears in Eells, The Rationale
of Corporate Philanthropy, 23 Vimi. SPEmCHES 216, 220 (1957) :
[A]ll the areas of meaningful human activity apart from public government:
the family; the local community; indigenous welfare groups; private schools,
colleges, and universities; associations of scholars, scientists, writers and
artists; indeed, the whole spectrum of voluntary associations through which
men hope in their own ways to achieve their goals.
11 Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HAtv. L. Rxv. 1145,
1156 (1932).
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the corporate manager can be thought to owe his obligation to the
corporate institution rather than to the stockholder-owners," he may
then employ corporate funds "in a manner appropriate to a person
practising a profession and imbued with a sense of social responsibility
without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust." I3 Professor Dodd's
analysis rested on the concept that the corporation is an institution
separate from its existence as a vehicle for the business interests of
its shareholders. Professor Dodd noted that such a concept was re-
flected among businessmen. He stated:
[T]here is in fact a growing feeling not only that business
has responsibilities to the community but that our corporate
managers who control business should voluntarily and with-
out waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a way
to fulfill those responsibilities.'4
Such a feeling persists today. Nevertheless, despite years of public
acceptance, there remains the significant question whether the under-
lying premise of Dodd's public obligation theory is acceptable. Written
during a time of economic depression, Professor Dodd's analysis
rested in part upon "contemporary discussion of the need for a planned
economic order . . ." ' and reached the conclusion that pursuit of
public obligations required acceptance of the view that the managers
are "guardians of all the interests which the corporation affects and
not merely servants of its absentee owners." "I He stated: "The ques-
tion . . . is not whether the voluntary acceptance of social responsi-
bility by corporate managers is workable, but whether experiments in
that direction run counter to fundamental principles of the law of
business corporations." -" By treating the fiduciary obligations of
managers as owed to the institution rather than to its shareholders,
Professor Dodd arrived at the conclusion that it would be proper for
corporate managers to devote the corporation's resources to the
welfare of its employees and of the community rather than to the
stockholders.'"
This article will attempt to demonstrate that contrary to the
theory expressed by Professor Dodd, the concept that the corporation
is a public institution is not necessary in order to justify most
publicly motivated corporate acts. Pursuit of public obligations is
2 Id. at 1160.
Is Id. at 1161.
14Id. at 1153-54.
15 Id. at 1152.
'(Id. at 1157.
17Id. at 1162.
Is Id. at 1163.
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not inconsistent with the "old" view that the fiduciary obligations
of managers are owed to the shareholders. 9 Given the proper ap-
proach, public obligations of private corporations may be satisfied by
a corporation without management fear of liability for breach of
fiduciary obligations, provided that the managers make full disclosure
of their intended and actual use of corporate power and assets to
satisfy public obligations.
I. TE PRIVATE OBLIGATION: PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
The businessman who incorporates a small business or who in-
corporates to promote a large business does so with an expectation of
making a profit. Although existence of the profit motive is elementary
to any business, it must be explicitly recognized in order that a useful
comparison with the public interest may be made.
Rejection of the profit motive as the guiding principle for cor-
porate behavior"0 and substitution of the public interest 2' carries
significant and extensive legal consequences. The traditional legal
notion that the corporate manager owes fiduciary obligations to the
shareholder-owners of the corporation is based on profit maximization.
Historically, the shareholder-owner has had the power by means of
a set of well developed legal rules to force the corporate manager to
account to him for the use of his property. Corporate power exercised
19 Two decades after his debate with Professor Dodd regarding the proper role
of the corporate "trustee," Professor Berle acknowledged his acceptance of Professor
Dodd's theses, stating:
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E.
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate
powers were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued
that these powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument
has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor
Dodd's contention.
BERLP, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIsT REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
20 Interestingly, one good statement of the proposition is Berle's: "[A]11 powers
granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, whether, derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily
and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their
interest appears." Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers it Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV.
1049 (1931), reprinted in BmLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPE RTY 248 (1933). As noted above, Professor Berle's position has changed. See
note 19 supra. See also Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLum.
L. REV. 433, 442-44 (1962).
2 1 Drucker states the status of the corporation as follows:
"Big business" . . . is "private!' and accepted as such-in the sense in which
a big university is "private." It is not government-run, but autonomous and
under its own rules, pursuing goals set by itself. But it is not a "private
affair" and the concern only of its stockholders, executives, and employees.
It is an autonomous institution-but a community asset and "public!' in its
conduct, in its mores, and its impacts.
Drucker, Big Business and the National Purpose, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1962,
p. 48, at 59; see Latham, The Commonwealth of the Corporation, 55 Nw. U.L. REV.
25 (1960).
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in the pursuit of profit for the benefit of shareholders has been subject
to the control established through these developed legal rules. If the
underlying profit theory upon which these rules of control are based is
discarded, however, it is inevitable that a new set of rules will be
established which will be designed to control the exercise of corporate
power in the pursuit of public obligations. Consideration of whether
society wishes to discard an entire system of controls based upon
profit maximization for business must be accompanied by consideration
of what the new control rules will contain.
The normal expectation that the corporation is operated for the
purpose of making profit is supported by modern economic theory.
Economic analysis has long proceeded upon the proposition that busi-
nesses operate for the purpose of maximizing profits, although most
often over the long rather than the short run period.2 According to
current economic theory such profit maximization within a competi-
tive context is of benefit to society.2" Not only does the pursuit of
profit encourage businesses to produce as efficiently as possible, but
given mobility of resources and ease of entry into industry, profit
maximization encourages allocation of resources in accordance with
the demands of the public. a Government encouragement of competi-
tion, profit seeking and profit maximization is convincingly reflected
in vigorous enforcement of laws designed to prevent the growth of
monopoly and oligopoly power and to encourage price competition.
Thus not only does economic theory assume that corporations exist to
make profit, but a large body of publicly supported law proceeds upon
= "Businessmen produce for profit." SAmuELsoN, Ecoxomics 384 (6th ed. 1964).
Samuelson's analysis of cost and supply rests upon "best profit" concepts. Id. at 444-71.
He recognizes as well that "it is probably good business to take the long view and
not concentrate on purely immediate gains. Many acts of altruism and apparent
generosity can be amply defended in terms of public relations and the maximization
of long run profits." Id. at 489.
23 Samuelson notes that the "pursuit of profit and avoidance of loss furnish the
motive force behind the whole competitive process . . . ." Id. at 617. The impact
of current business mystique that maximization of profits may be bad is revealed by
the following report:
Any sampling of public opinion shows some hostility toward profit. A scientist
recently asked a random sample of businessmen if they "tried to maximize
their profit." To a man, they all denied this firmly, perhaps because they
pictured a profit maximizer as some kind of chiseling extortionist or miser.
Id. at 607-08.
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in MASON, THE CoRPoaIroN IN MODERN Soc~mr 46, 63 (1960): "[T]he quest for
maximum revenue in a competitive market leads to a system of prices, and an allo-
cation of resources and rewards, superior to any alternative, in its contributions to the
economic welfare of the community as a whole."
See also Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.L. & EcoNomics
75, 80-82 (1960).
2 4 That is, assuming conditions sufficient to fulfill the economist's model of "perfect
competition." See SAmuEsoSN, EcoNomics 444-71 (6th ed. 1964).
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the proposition that the competitive pursuit of profit is desirable for
the economy2 5
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OBLIGATIONS
The possibility of conflict between activity designed to benefit
society (the public obligation) and activity directed toward profit
maximization (the private obligation) is evident. Of course, an
activity normally thought to satisfy a public obligation may be justified
on the ground that it also fulfills the performance of a private obliga-
tion. However, if the activity contributes in no way to profit maximi-
zation, a conflict exists. The individual obligated to manage the
corporation must do so loyally and with care.26 If he acts in the public
interest and not for his own benefit, his activity is not proscribed by
theories relating to conflict of interest and breach of his duty of
loyalty.2 7  The relevant inquiry becomes whether he violates his duty
of care when he devotes resources of the corporation to nonprofit
activities.
Analysis of existing cases regarding the corporate manager's duty
of care makes it clear that the likelihood of liability for mismanage-
ment of a business corporation is slight. A director will be subject
to liability for mismanagement only when it is established that he has
been negligent or neglectful in his duties, that the damage incurred is
causally related to his lack of care or diligence, and that the damage is
measurable." The officer or director who has been diligent is pro-
tected by various standards which make it difficult to impose liability."
25An aspect of the debate over the antitrust cases appeared recently in Fortune
magazine in which one view was that:
We have inherited a marvelously responsive and intricate mechanism, the free
market, which we do not understand or appreciate, and so, like savages left
a tractor, we poke and rip at it, hit it with clubs and mutter incantations, all
in the vain hope of improving its performance. The courts and the legislature
preside like a body of medicine men, giving the tribe a new set of chants and
directing that yet another piston rod be ripped out or spark plug smashed in
order to make the mysterious mechanism behave. This pattern of behavior
will take a long time to correct. An educational process of such magnitude
is necessarily slow, particularly when there are strong know-nothing forces
in the society who will vehemently oppose and vilify the ideas themselves.
Bork & Bowman, The Crisis it; Antitrust, Fortune, Dec. 1963, p. 138, 201; reply
-Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, Fortune, Aug. 1964, p. 135.
2 6 E.g., BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoRPO.ATIONS 403-32 (duty of care), 432-553
(duty of loyalty) (3d ed. 1959).
27 The normal statement of the question regarding duty of loyalty assumes a
situation where "the director's fiduciary duty to the corporation makes it improper
for him to engage in the transaction or improper for him to derive a personal ad-
vantage." Id. at 432.
2 8 Id. at 403-32.
29 In Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 546 (1880), an early leading case,
the standard to be met by directors of a bank was set forth as "the same degree of
care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own
affairs." Id. at 71, 37 Am. Rep. at 548.
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Ballantine suggests a so-called "prudent director" test, which ap-
parently is accepted in the majority of jurisdictionsY0 Another
test of negligence, the "business judgment rule," is stated in terms of
managerial discretion in business affairs. Although the proposition
is not always articulated dearly, it seems apparent that the business
judgment rule differs little from the prudent director test and will be
available to protect officers or directors who have used good faith in
managing the corporationY1
A recent statement of the business judgment rule may be found
in Poirier v. Welch 2 in which the court was concerned with a com-
plaint that the appointed board of directors of Communications Satellite
Corporation had decided to select six of its number as candidates
for re-election. The court stated:
In any event, in the absence of any proof to the contrary,
and there is none here, the question was solely a matter of
business judgment on the part of the present Board of Di-
rectors, which is not subject to judicial review. This Court
may not substitute itself for the Board in determining matters
of internal management of the corporation, unless there is
some violation of law or fraud. 3
Both the "business judgment rule" and the "prudent director test"
are significant barriers to the imposition of liability on a director who
has acted in satisfaction of what he conceives to be a public obligation.
To invoke the protection of either rule, a director need only demon-
strate that the activity in which the corporation is engaged can be
justified as short term or long term profit maximization.
Underlying this defense as it relates to public obligations is the
hypothesis that the relationship between activity normally considered
to be in the public interest and profit maximization must be a reason-
able one. This hypothesis in turn assumes that the business judgment
rule uses profit maximization as its standard. Additionally, profit
maximization need not be short term, but can take place over a long
period of time. Over the long term, activity designed to satisfy public
obligations will in many cases be consistent with the welfare of the
corporation and its profits. These assertions imply that the nature
of the corporation has not changed, that activities solely in the public
interest are inconsistent with corporate welfare, and that therefore such
30 "The just rule is that the directors undertake to use such care and diligence
and give such time and attention as ordinarily careful and prudent men could reason-
ably be expected to exercise on behalf of such a corporation under similar circum-
stances." BALLANTNE, CoRpoRATioNs 158 (rev. ed. 1946).
31 Id. at 161.
32 233 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1964).
33 Id. at 439.
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activities will not be protected by the business judgment rule. Indeed,
if the concept that the stockholder is the owner of the corporation is dis-
carded,34 it is inevitable that new standards will be created by which
to judge corporate action directed to the public interest. As Professor
Adolf A. Berle has observed, no power absolute in terms is absolute in
fact.35 The power of managers to act in the public interest without
any regard to corporate interest must be subject to "essential equitable
limitations." " It is doubtful whether such limitations when applied
to corporate actions in the public interest would have the same flexi-
bility and generosity now associated with the business judgment rule.
A. The Public Obligation and Long Run Profit Maximization
The concern expressed above will be unimportant if it can be
demonstrated that all corporate activity nominally devoted to public
goals can be justified in terms of long term profit maximization. Cer-
tainly most corporate activity is so related to profit maximization that it
falls within the business judgment category.
Activity clearly within the "public obligation" category can be
classified in the following ways:
1. Conformance With Legislative Standards
Much corporate activity is in response to standards dictated by the
public policy of federal and state statutes. For example, corporations
which refrain from entering into collusive pricing agreements can be
characterized as pursuing the public objectives of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, all business activity designed to conform to federal or state
regulation can be described as profit maximizing activity, since violation
of the law may lead to substantial fines and penalties. For example, as
a result of government and private Sherman Act suits against General
Electric,37 that company reported that its nine month earnings for
1964 had been reduced from 203,980,000 dollars to 153,199,000 dollars
34 Cf. Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1490-91 (1958).
35 See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1073
(1931).
36 Ibid. Examination of articles written on subjects in which the public obliga-
tion question is not conceived to be at issue reveals how thoroughly entrenched is the
concept that the duty of corporate managers is toward the corporation and its owners
rather than the public. E.g., Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 22, 32-33 (1963), which suggests that "the exclusive benefit of all activity
within the scope of custody belongs to the entity," id. at 35, and that "the overriding
objective of the corporate entity is its own common good, which is, generally, to make
profits." Id. at 42. Analyzing liability for sale of a controlling corporate interest,
Bayne finds an apparent identity between the shareholders and the corporation, stating:
"To say that the so-called premium belongs to all the shareholders is to say that the
premium belongs to the corporation." Id. at 65.
3 7 Sherman Act § 8, 26 Stat 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
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due to settlements involving only the year 1960.8 Such losses lend
practical support to a refusal to engage in activity which might other-
wise maximize profits in the short run. Thus, compliance with legis-
lative standards, a public obligation, may be motivated and justified
by profit maximization concepts.
2. Community Welfare Activity
Modem day corporations engage in a number of activities
which many years ago would not have been thought to be business
related. Such activities qualify as public obligations by virtue of their
relationship to the needs of the community. The clearest example
of such activity is the charitable contribution sanctioned in most juris-
dictions by statute.' The Model Business Corporation Act contains
the following provision:
Section 4. GENERAL POWERS
Each corporation shall have power: . . . (m) To make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific
or educational purposes; and in time of war to make dona-
tions in aid of war activities.4°
It might be asserted that the power to make charitable contribu-
tions gives a corporate board of directors power to make donations
for whatever purposes and in whatever quantity it wishes. As a
practical matter the amount of contributions which a corporation will
make is probably limited by the Internal Revenue Code provision
limiting the deductibility of corporate contributions to five percent of
the corporation's net earnings for each year.4' Conceivably, however,
a board of directors motivated by a desire to satisfy public obliga-
tions could use corporate funds in excess of that limitation to promote
a desired charitable end. A shareholder might counter with an action
against the directors claiming that the contributions in excess of the
five percent limitation were a waste of corporate assets for which the
directors should be liable. Such an attack could be met by a defense
based upon the business judgment rule. In the case of a contribution
to an educational institution, for example, the argument could be that
the contributions were reasonably related to corporate needs such as:
corporate interest in creating a public image; the necessity for de-
veloping educated individuals within the community who would ulti-
38 Wall Street J., Oct. 12, 1964, p. 22, col. 1.
39All but a few states have statutory provisions authorizing donations. See the
list of statutes in ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT Awx. § 4(m) (1960).
4 0 Ibid.
4 1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b) (2).
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mately be willing and anxious to be employed in that community; or
the necessity for developing special talents which would ultimately be
useful to the corporation. These arguments would be easier for the
corporation and its directors if the charitable contributions were
reasonably related to the corporation's general size, its net annual
earnings, its capital, and its place in the community.
Justification of this type appears in the Report of the 79th Annual
Meeting of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) ' reporting a share-
holder's proposal to amend the corporation's by-laws so that no cor-
porate funds could be given to any charitable, educational, or similar
organization except for purposes in direct furtherance of the business
interests of the corporation. The argument of the shareholder was
that: "Your Directors are giving millions of dollars of your corpora-
tion's money to charity. This seems wrong. Your company is sup-
posedly run solely for the stockholders' benefit. It is not an ele-
emosynary institution." ' The company opposed the resolution. Its
president, Mr. M. J. Rathbone, stated:
We in the Jersey Company believe in being good corporate
citizens. We think the principle of corporate giving is well
established. It is encouraged by our tax laws; it has been
upheld in our courts; and the public has come to expect it
of corporations. Perhaps this was not so, say, some twenty-
five years ago, but it is today. In our judgment these con-
tributions are extremely important if Jersey is to merit the
good will of the public, which is essential to the prosperity
of your company.4
The position taken by the management of Standard Oil that charitable
activity would redound to the benefit of the corporation conforms with
the business judgment standard.
3. Response to Government Pressure
An additional area of business activity which can be justified
according to business judgment concepts is corporate action taken
either because the government is bringing indirect pressure upon the
corporation or because pressure might be used by the government.
Large corporations 45 are particularly vulnerable to governmental
pressure because of the continual threat of legislation aimed at reducing
42Report of the 79th Annual Meeting, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),
May 24, 1961.
43 Statement of Mr. Watson Washburn, representing Mrs. Alice V. Gordon.
Id. at 15.
44 Statement of Mr. M. J. Rathbone, President of the Standard Oil Company.
Ibid.
45 Analysis in terms of large corporations does not mean the principles set forth
are inapplicable to small corporations.
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their size or controlling them." The pressure which President John
F. Kennedy used on the steel industry provides an excellent illustration
of nonlegislative government power which is available." On April
10, 1962, several steel companies announced a general increase in
prices which President Kennedy had opposed as inflationary. After
seventy-two hours of intense pressure by the Administration, the indus-
try rescinded its price increase.48  Government actions during this
period included: the President's statement at a news conference that the
price increase was unjustified; an expression of concern by Senator
Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee; threats
by Senator Kefauver and the Justice Department to investigate the
price increase; suggestions for legislation empowering the courts to
prohibit price increases in basic industries such as steel until there had
been a "cooling off period"; calls by Administration officials to repre-
sentatives of certain steel companies which had not yet joined in the
price increase requesting that they refrain from raising prices; and
authorization for FBI investigation of a statement by the president
of Bethlehem Steel that he had objected to the price increase.49 The
New York Times summarized the first twenty-four hours of activity
as follows:
Thus by nightfall on Wednesday. . . the administration was
pressing forward on four lines of action: First, the rallying
of public opinion behind the President and against the com-
panies. Second, divide-and-conquer operation within the steel
industry. Third, antitrust pressure from the Justice Depart-
ment, the Federal Trade Commission, the Senate and the
House. Fourth, the mobilization of friendly forces within the
business world to put additional pressure on the companies.
0
Subsequently, Secretary of Defense MacNamara indicated that the
Defense Department had ordered defense contractors to shift purchases
to companies that had not raised prices. Still later, the Defense
46 Berle presents an "incomplete list of the areas of American economy presently
controlled . . . ." BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CA~rrAs.iST REvoLuTioN 49 (1954).
He discusses the force of public opinion and the fear of government action in several
of his works. BERLE, PoWER WrrHOUT PROPERTY 92 (1959) ("In American society,
the ultimate limitation on economic power is the possibility of energizing, in any
one of various ways, the political power of the government."); BERLE, THE 20TH
CErtRY CAPITALI T REVOLuTiON 54 (1954); Berle, Modern Functions of the Cor-
porate System, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 433, 443 (1962).
47 See Carroll, Steel: A 72-Hour Drana With an All-Star Cast, N.Y. Times,
April 23, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. at 25, cols. 1-8.
50 Id. at 25, col. 5.
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Department actually awarded a contract for more than five million
dollars worth of a special armor plate to the Lukens Steel Company,
which had not raised prices.51
When government pressure is brought to bear on a business cor-
poration in this way, the directors of the corporation can readily argue
that the resulting reaction is justified under the business judgment rule
even though not responsive to specific legislation. Failure to accede
to such pressure would invite serious reprisals for business, either
through administrative activity or through future legislation. 5
B. Public Obligations Unrelated to Corporate Welfare
Three categories of business activity fulfilling public obligations
have been examined: activity carried on in conformity with legislative
standards, activity carried on in response to government pressure, and
activity carried on in pursuit of community welfare needs which also
benefits the corporation. All of the activity discussed thus far can
be justified as being in the best interests of the corporation upon
business judgment standards.
Arguably there is another area of business activity in which public
obligations are fulfilled-activity which is unrelated to the welfare of
the corporation.5" In A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,' a New
Jersey decision, a group of shareholders challenged a corporate dona-
tion of 1,500 dollars to Princeton University. Despite the existence
of a resolution by the board of directors that the contribution was in
the corporation's best interest, thus invoking the business judgment
rule, the court embraced a larger proposition that, "modem conditions
require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as
private responsibilities as members of the communities within which
they operate." r Although the court had previously recognized the
common-law rule that "those who managed the corporation could not
disburse any corporate funds for philanthropic or other worthy public
cause unless the expenditure would benefit the corporation," ", it chose
to advance that rule only as an alternative method of upholding the
donation.5. The New Jersey view might be broadly construed to
support the proposition that corporate managers have power to make
charitable contributions or to take other steps to satisfy public obliga-
51 Id. at 25, col. 8.
52 See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
53 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
5413 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
55 Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 590. The court cited Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trusteesf, 45 HAxv. L. RHv. 1145 (1932), 13 N.J. at 149, 98 A.2d at 584,
and BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1948), 13
N.J. at 149, 98 A.2d at 584.
&6 Id. at 149, 98 A. 2d at 584.
57 Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 590.
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tions without regard to the benefit which may accrue to the corporation.
Although such an interpretation of the corporate role is arguable, it is
not necessary and should not be followed."'
One assumption underlying the pure public obligation theory has
been suggested by Professor Berle who asserts it is incorrect to
assume that "as a matter of course men would always act according
to their calculation of personal profit or advantage." ' He is dis-
turbed by the proposition that activities which stem from altruistic
motives ' must be upheld for business reasons. He states:
The fact is that boards of directors or corporation executives
are often faced with situations in which they quite humanly
and simply consider that such and such is the decent thing
to do and ought to be done. Or if one chooses, that it is a
politically expedient thing and ought to be done. They apply
the potential profits or public relations tests later on, a sort
of left-handed justification in this curious free-market world
where an obviously moral or decent or humane action has to
be apologized for on the ground that, conceivably, you may
somehow make money by it."
Despite Professor Berle's concern, the better view is that when a
trustee is dealing with property that belongs to another, he must
justify his altruistic action on a business basis. Since most actions
can be so justified,' the traditional profit maximization theory yields
a result consistent with corporate satisfaction of public obligations.
No good reason remains for discarding the existing guidelines to
managerial responsibility.'8
68 Prunty, Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REv. 467, 471-72 (1960),
concludes that all of the charitable gift cases can be reconciled with the common-law
rule of Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 52 Ch. D. 689, 698 (1883), that the activity must
be "reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the company's business for the com-
pany's benefit." He asserts that the Hutton principle "assumes a business judgment
and necessarily excludes a wholly altruistic act." Prunty, supra at 474. The chari-
table giving cases are thus viewed as involving only an extension of business judgment
concepts to recognize that indirect and long run benefits fall within the business judg-
ment category. Ibid.
59 BEjL THE AmmicAx EcoNomic REPuBLic 201 (1963).
00 Referring to the "Protestant ethic," id. at 192, Berle suggests that the great
success of the United States economy has been due to what he calls the "Transcen-
dental Margin," defined as "the product of a value system that causes effort and
expenditure beyond that calculated as conducive to the personal advantage of an
individual or his immediate family group." Id. at 202.
61 Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. Rev. 433, 444
(1962).
62 See text accompanying notes 37-52 sup ra.
03 Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.L. & Ecowomics 75, 82
(1960), suggests that:
The only statutes or cases which suggest any departure from this [profit
maximization] standard are those relating to corporate gifts. They afford
no basis for Professor Berle's general assertion that "modern directors are
not limited to running business enterprises for maximum profit but are in
fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community system."
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The policy advocated here is that reliance upon traditional profit
maximization theory does not amount to rejection of modern day
notions of corporate responsibility. Within the confines of the business
judgment rule there is ample opportunity for expenditure of corporate
funds upon worthwhile public welfare measures. The only limitation
is that corporate policy must be reasonably related to long term
corporate benefit.4
This analysis might be tested in relation to the field of civil rights.
Currently, the civil rights area suggests possibilities for business ac-
tivity induced by legislative compulsion, other types of government
pressure, or mere desire to satisfy public need. Every corporation
must conform to the Civil Rights Act ' and in that regard will be
performing a public obligation imposed by legislation. Title II re-
quires certain businesses whose operations affect interstate commerce
to avoid discrimination 66 and Title VII requires that corporations and
other businesses refrain from discrimination in employment practices.67
Thus, activity designed to conform with the standards laid down by
the Civil Rights Act falls clearly within the sound business judgment
category.
Given the flexibility of the business judgment rule, however, other
corporate activity directed toward improving civil rights could probably
be justified as contributing to long range profit potential., For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that United States Steel should wield
its economic power in Birmingham, Alabama, to force businesses there
to offer opportunities to Negroes.' If such action should be taken, the
64 Eells, The Role of Corporate Enterprise it; Society, 23 VrrA. SPEEcHES 216,
218 (1957), recognizes the distinction between corporate activities which must be
justified "on the balance sheet in the forseeable future" and those which are designed
"to strengthen the environmental factors on which the future of the business depends."
It is in the latter area that the modern view of the business judgment rule suggested
in this article vill probably be tested.
65 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
6678 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2000a(b) (1964).
6778 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2 000e (1964).
6 8 Except, of course, activity which bankrupts the corporation in the short run.
69 [C]ritics . . . have contended that United States Steel, which is the largest
employer in Birmingham [Alabama], could ease racial strife there by exerting
its economic influence in behalf of improved Negro opportunities in the com-
munity.
These critics say that the company could help bring this about by warning
the city it did not want its management people to live in a tension-ridden
atmosphere, and by making it clear to banks and suppliers that it intended to
give more business to those who favored better Negro opportunities.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1963, p. 1, col. 7. Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of United States Steel, replied by letter to the Times, in part, as follows:
I believe that while government-through the proper exercise of its legislative
and administrative powers-may seek to compel social reforms, any attempt
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directors could argue that the company would be better off in the long
run if racial strife were eliminated and that in the best judgment of
the directors the elimination of such strife could be accomplished by
use of the corporation's economic power to accomplish that objective.
On the other hand, if the view of the New Jersey court in the charitable
contribution cases were the law," the profit maximization justification
would not be necessary. United States Steel would be entitled to
wield its great power for public welfare purposes solely because it owes
a public obligation," and without any extant system of legal control
over the exercise of that power. Although the result may be the same
as when the activities are profit justified, a bold public obligation theory
raises significant and disturbing difficulties.
1. Who Selects the Managers?
If the theory that managers may use the assets of the corporation
in order to satisfy public obligations without considering corporate
profits is accepted, the role of a public institution is thrust upon the
corporation. It then becomes important to know how managers are
selected. Despite reforms suggested by advocates of "shareholder
democracy," 72 a dissatisfied shareholder in most publicly held cor-
porations is unable to influence the election of a new manager. The
control of the proxy machinery is vested in management, and indi-
vidual votes are too widely dispersed to be effective. The shareholder
of such a corporation has in a sense been disenfranchised, since he is
unable either to influence or select the management of the corporation.
Professor Berle poses the problem as follows:
Change of management by contesting for stockholders' votes
is extremely rare, and increasingly difficult and expensive to
the point of impossibility. The legal presumption in favor of
management, and the natural unwillingness of courts to
by a private organization like U.S. Steel to impose its views, its beliefs and
its will upon the community by resorting to economic compulsion or coercion
would be repugnant to our American constitutional concepts, and that appro-
priate steps to correct this abuse of corporate power would be universally
demanded by public opinion, by Government and by The New York Times.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1963, p. 36, cols. 5-6.
'70 See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
71 For an opinion regarding the use of power by United States Steel to solve
racial problems see, Hacker, Do Corporations Have a Social Duty?, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1963, § 6 (Magazine), p. 21.
72 Representative works discussing the general problem of shareholder democracy
include: BmLE & MEANS, THE: MODERN CoRORATOTiON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) ;
EmERSON & LATCHAm, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954); LMaNGSToN, THE ASERI-
CAN STOCKHOLDER (1958); Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate
Management Responsible?, in MAsoN, THE CoRoRATIoN IN MODERN SocIETY 46
(1960); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 CoLum. L.
R~v. 399 (1962).
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control or reverse management action save in cases of the
more elementary types of dishonesty or fraud, leaves manage-
ment with substantially absolute power.73
Although those discussing shareholder democracy have been pri-
marily concerned with the possible use of corporate power for the
self-interest of managers rather than with the use of corporate power
in the public interest, some have suggested appointing public repre-
sentatives to corporate boards.74 Such a suggestion indicates the im-
portant problem underlying the theory that management may act for
the public interest without regard to the corporation's interest. Such
a theory contemplates that corporate directors will be empowered to
decide matters relating to the public welfare but that they will not be
selected by or be responsible to the public. If the corporation acts as
a public institution, the corporation should then be controlled by the
public.75 Professor Berle has recently expressed his confidence in the
"instincts and impulses" of the men who are directing corporations.76
Such confidence may be merited for the present, but it should not be
substituted for a profit theory which protects the corporate welfare
should these managers decide to recognize their public obligations in
full magnitude. 7
If corporate managers believe that their only obligation is to
maximize profits and that any activities satisfying public obligations
must be justified as profit maximizing, the objections just raised will
be partially overcome. By pursuing private rather than public ends,
corporate managers will nullify the need for their selection by the
public. By pursuing profit maximizing activities, the corporate man-
agers will in part overcome the criticism frequently raised by advocates
of shareholder democracy that corporate managers are not paying
sufficient attention to the obligations owed to the corporate owners.
2. Is a Pure Public Obligation Theory Necessary?
When the basis for traditional corporate fiduciary obligation
theory is examined, another difficulty in allowing corporate action in
I3 BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPrrALxsT REVOLUTION 180 (1954).
74 See the list of solutions in Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate
Management Responsible?, in MASON, THE CoRPORATIoN IN MoDERN Socx=Y (1960).
75 This question is already being raised with regard to tax exempt private founda-
tions which have amassed large amounts of property. Sacks, The Role of Philan-
thropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REv. 516 (1960).
7 6 BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIsr REVOLUTION 186 (1954). See also
Bm, THE Ammuc w EcoNomIC REPUBLIC 43 (1963).
17 Manne, The "Higher Criticisi' of the Modern Corporation, 62 CoLum. L.
Rxv. 399, 415 (1962), does not share Berle's confidence in the skills of management
in making welfare decisions. See also Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is
Corporate Management Responsible?, in MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SocIErv 46, 68 (1960).
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the public interest without regard to corporate benefit becomes ap-
parent-the shareholder will lose his protection against use of cor-
porate assets for nonshareholders. The traditional fiduciary obligation
theory insists that a corporate manager owes an obligation of care and
loyalty to shareholders. If a public obligation theory unrelated to
profit maximization becomes the law, the corporate manager who is
not able to act in his own self interest without violating his fiduciary
obligation, may nevertheless act in the public interest without violating
that obligation. His response to a shareholder suit alleging that he
should be liable for devoting the assets of his corporation to a public
use might well be as follows:
If the assets of the corporation are devoted to paying divi-
dends to stockholders, and the payment is made equitably,
no shareholder objection will be entertained. The dividend
payment will not violate any duty of loyalty nor be a waste
of corporate assets, since the assets will benefit a group to
whom the manager of the corporation owes a fiduciary obliga-
tion as trustee. On the other hand, if corporate assets are
devoted to the personal interests of the manager, he will
violate his trustee's duty of loyalty. If, however, the cor-
poration owes an obligation directly to the public, use of
corporate assets for public purposes is not a use devoted to
the special interest of the trustee, but is merely a permissible
payment for the use of a second group of corporate benefici-
aries.
If a corporation owes an obligation to the public which is unrelated to
interests of the corporation, then fulfillment of a public obligation will
be an adequate defense to any shareholder suit alleging waste of
corporate assets, mismanagement of the corporation, or other mal-
feasance in office. Thus, if the pure corporate obligation theory is
adopted, management activities can then be tested against a standard of
"public good" unrelated to the well being of the corporation's owners,
and the shareholder will have lost part of his ability to make manage-
ment account to him. If the standard of sound management actions
becomes merely that of the public good, limitless "legitimate" uses for
corporate funds other than shareholder welfare will be possible.
Management might, for example, use corporate funds without limit
for objectives such as contributions to scientific and charitable organi-
zations, research activities devoted to public welfare purposes, higher
wages and salaries for its employees, lower prices 8 or a host of other
public considerations.
78 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co,, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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A pure public obligation theory of corporate management cannot
be supported without corollary acceptance of the corporation as a
public rather than a private institution. Since it is possible at present
for corporate management to pursue most public objectives while at
the same time acting in a manner consistent with the corporation's
private interest, the erection of a pure public obligation theory is
unnecessary. At present shareholder suits alleging misuse of
corporate funds in satisfaction of public obligations can be met with
business judgment theories consistent with the existence of the private
corporation as a private institution. Suggestions such as those ad-
vanced by Professor Dodd and others that the professional manager
should pursue public objectives without reference to profit maximization
can only lead to confusion and difficulty for the corporate manager and
for the corporation. In contrast, corporate activity designed to satisfy
both public obligations and long range profit maximization is consistent
with management fiduciary obligations to stockholders and with the
proper private role of the corporation. As Professor Eugene Rostow
states:
The responsibility of corporate directors requires redefini-
tion. It may give us a warm and comfortable feeling to say
that the director is a trustee for the community, rather than
for his stockholders; that he is a semipublic official, or a
quasi-public official, or some other kind of hyphenated public
officer. It would be more constructive, however, to seek re-
definition in another sense: to restate the law of corporate
trusteeship in terms which take full account of the social ad-
vances of this century, but which direct the directors more
sharply to concentrate their efforts on discharging their
historic economic duties to their stockholders.79
The modern solution may simply be that corporate managers
should continue to recognize the traditional role of profit maximization,
but that in so doing they should consider as important factors com-
munity welfare, legislation and public pressure, all of which will affect
the long term profits of the corporation. Nevertheless, any activities
of the corporation which cannot be justified in terms of long run profit
maximization should be avoided.
IV. THE ROLE OF DISCLOSUI
Although helpful in placing the relationship of the corporate
manager to the corporation in the proper perspective, management de-
79 Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in MAsoN, THE Co1 roRATi0ix MODERN Socmry 46, 68-69 (1960).
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votion to long run profit maximization may not be of great help to
the corporate shareholder. The shareholder is still faced with the
difficulties inherent in bringing a derivative suit or in attempting to
initiate a proxy fight. Although recognition of the validity of a profit
maximization theory as the core of corporate existence may reduce
demands for public representation on boards of directors, the share-
holder must still contend with a viable business judgment rule giving
the corporate management something close to autonomy in control of
the corporation as long as a reasonable relationship to profit motives
can be demonstrated.
However, the autonomy need not be complete. Several provisions
of the federal securities laws offer protection to shareholders against
nondisclosure of material facts o A measure of protection may be
afforded the shareholder if the definition of "material facts" under the
federal securities laws is expanded. Since it is probable that in the
short run the earnings and dividends of a corporation which recognizes
public obligations will not be as great as are those of corporations
which do not recognize such obligations, management's decision to
forego short run profits will probably be material to the average
stockholder."1 Thus, a management policy determination to pursue
public obligations may become a material fact which must be publicly
disclosed. Failure to do so may give rise to liabilities both for the
company and for corporate management:'
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the nature of the corporation is no longer what it
was during the early development of corporate law. However, the
growth of large corporations and the development of the concept that
corporations owe public obligations need not herald the abandonment
80 See, e.g., (1) registration provisions in the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 10,
11, 12(1), 48 Stat. 77, 81, 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77k,
771(1) (1958), and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 48 Stat. 892, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958) ; (2) proxy solicitation requirements in the 1934 act,
§ 14, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958) ; and (3) general fraud provi-
sions in the 1933 act, §§ 12(2), 17, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q
(1958), and the 1934 act, §§ 9, 10, 48 Stat. 889, 891, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1958). The
broadest protection seems to be under Rule lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964). That rule makes it unlawful to make an
untrue statement of a material fact or to refrain from disclosing material facts in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities.
81 For an interesting recent discussion of materiality under Rule lOb-5, see List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
82 For references regarding Rule 10b-5 see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law":
An Assessment, 78 HA~v. L. REv. 1146, 1160 (1965) ; Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 & n.2,
687 (1963) ; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Comment, 74
YALa L.J. 658 (1965).
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of profit maximization. Whether induced by government legislation,
government pressure, or merely by enlightened attitudes of the cor-
poration regarding its long range potential as a unit in society, cor-
porate activities carried on in satisfaction of public obligations can be
consistent with profit maximization objectives. In contrast, justifica-
tion of public obligations upon bold concepts of public need without
corporate benefit will merely serve to reduce further the owner's in-
fluence on his corporation and to create additional demands for public
participation in corporate management. Corporate managers will
be wise both to disclose their decisions to satisfy public obligations
with corporate assets and to justify their decisions on theories of profit
maximization. Under such circumstances it is likely that management
may use corporate assets to satisfy public obligations without fear
of liability.
